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More Fair Play for Suspects: 
HM Advocate v Higgins
In an article entitled “Fair Play for the Criminal”, published in 1954,1 Andrew Dewar 
Gibb railed against the decision in HM Advocate v Keen,2 where the trial judge had 
held that a police-lieutenant could not give evidence of what he had heard two men 
shout to each other while in the cells at a police station. Describing the decision as 
“obviously wrong”, Gibb argued:3
If a voluntary statement may be received why should not a carelessly shouted remark? Men 
in a police station who shout their observations must surely be taken to know that policemen 
will hear them. That did not deter these accused. Such a decision, it is submitted, is carrying 
the idea of fair play beyond all reason.
For Gibb, Keen was symptomatic of a more signifi cant problem with the Scottish 
law of evidence, namely the courts’ reliance on the concept of “fairness” in deter-
mining the admissibility of irregularly obtained evidence, particularly confessions. 
Gibb argued that the courts’ application of this approach was, at least in some respects, 
“little short of absurd… extending ‘fair play’ or ‘fairness’ to the prisoner almost as if the 
occupation of proving and punishing crime were a kind of sport”.4
Although Keen can no longer be regarded as good law, the courts having been 
prepared to admit similarly obtained evidence in a number of cases since,5 fairness 
remains the determinative criterion in deciding whether confession evidence should 
be excluded as having been improperly obtained.6 The recent decision in HM 
Advocate v Higgins7 provides an opportunity to explore some of the diffi culties with 
this approach.
A. THE DECISION IN HIGGINS
In Higgins, two men were arrested on suspicion of involvement in an armed bank 
robbery. Initially they were held on different fl oors of a cell block in police quarters, 
but it was decided to move one of the men so that they were in adjacent cells. The 
purpose of this arrangement was to “facilitate conversation between the two accused 
1 A D Gibb, “Fair play for the criminal” 1954 JR 199. No doubt the title of Gibb’s article is unfortunate 
given the presumption of innocence (hence the title of this note), but Gibb did not seem particularly 
enamoured with that rule either: see the same article, at 199-200.
2 1926 JC 1.
3 Gibb (n 1) at 219.
4 Gibb (n 1) at 199.
5 Welsh v HM Advocate (1974) 38 J Crim L 151; HM Advocate v O’Donnell 1975 SLT (Sh Ct) 22; Jamieson 
v Annan 1988 JC 62.
6 See generally A G Walker and N M L Walker, The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 2nd edn, by M L Ross 
with J Chalmers (2000) paras 9.11-9.21.
7 [2006] HCJ 5, 2006 SLT 946, 2006 SCCR 305.
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and the hearing and noting of any conversation” by “listening offi cers” who had been 
posted outside the cells.8 In due course, the Crown sought at the subsequent trial to 
adduce evidence about conversations which had taken place between the two men. 
After a trial within a trial, Lord Macphail sustained a defence objection to the admis-
sibility of this evidence.9
Although Lord Macphail’s decision was ultimately based on “fairness”, the case 
is complicated by a number of factors. First, the decision to move one suspect and 
engage in eavesdropping had been taken without reference to the Regulation of Inves-
tigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 (RIPSA) and the Code of Practice on covert 
surveillance.10 This meant that no authorisation had been sought for the actions of the 
police, in turn meaning that the evidence had been obtained in breach of RIPSA.11 
Secondly, because RIPSA had not been complied with, the surveillance was not “in 
accordance with the law” and had breached the suspects’ rights under article 8 (the 
right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.12
Lord Macphail held, however, that the breach of RIPSA did not automatically 
render the evidence inadmissible,13 and said that he “did not fi nd it necessary to resort 
to the ECHR” in order to reach his decision.14 In his view, the matter could be dealt 
with by applying the common law test of fairness. Specifi cally, it had been held in 
Jamieson v Annan15 that evidence of an overhead remark made in custody would 
be admissible “provided that the remark is made voluntarily and not as the result 
of an inducement or trap”.16 In Lord Macphail’s view, the police tactics in Higgins 
could “only be described as a trap”, and the evidence was rendered inadmissible by a 
straightforward application of the rule in Jamieson v Annan.17
B. EAVESDROPPING ELSEWHERE
The fact that it was not “necessary” for Lord Macphail to resort to the ECHR to reach 
his decision should not be taken to mean that a Convention-based approach would 
have resulted in the same outcome. Although the suspects’ rights under article 8 of the 
Convention had unquestionably been breached, it is well established that the fact that 
8 Higgins at para 5 per Lord Macphail.
9 The three accused were then acquitted of all charges after the Crown decided not to proceed on certain 
charges and Lord Macphail sustained a submission of no case to answer in respect of the remaining 
charge. See para 30.
10 Covert Surveillance: Code of Practice, issued by Scottish Ministers under the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 s 24(1) and brought  into force by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
(Covert Surveillance – Code of Practice) (Scotland) Order 2003, SSI 2003/183. The text is available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2003/03/16695/19532.
11 Para 23.
12 Para 29.
13 Para 24, citing Henderson v HM Advocate 2005 JC 301 at para 36 per Lord Hamilton. See also Gilchrist 
v HM Advocate 2005 JC 34.
14 Para 29.
15 1988 JC 62.
16 1988 JC 62 at 64 per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross. Here, Lord Ross is simply approving the conclusion reached 
by Sheriff Macphail (as he then was) himself in HM Advocate v O’Donnell 1975 SLT (Sh Ct) 22.
17 Higgins at para 21.
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evidence has been obtained in breach of article 8 does not automatically mean that its 
use in court will breach article 6.18 For that reason, the European Court has not been 
prepared to hold that the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping on suspects in 
police custody amounts to a breach of article 6.19
The facts of Higgins are strikingly similar to those in the English case of R v Bailey 
and Smith,20 where two suspects were placed together in a bugged cell after they 
had been charged. The Court of Appeal refused to hold that the evidence obtained 
thereby should have been excluded by the trial judge. One reason for the difference 
from Higgins is that the English courts have historically laid considerable stress on 
whether or not incriminating statements were made “voluntarily”, and the Bailey and 
Smith court held that it was wrong “to equate voluntarily talking to each other with 
making involuntary statements to the police”.21 Lord Macphail, however, seems to 
have taken the view either that the voluntary nature of the statements in Higgins 
was irrelevant, or that the “trap” meant that they could not properly be considered 
“voluntary”.22
C. WHAT IS FAIRNESS FOR?
“Fairness” is a conspicuously malleable concept, and the Scottish courts’ consistent 
reliance on it obscures any discussion of the reason for disallowing improperly obtained 
evidence. Writing with particular reference to confession evidence, Ashworth has 
identifi ed three possible operative principles: fi rst, a “reliability principle”, secondly, a 
“disciplinary principle”, and thirdly, a “protective principle”.23
In the context of Higgins, each of these principles might lead to a different conclu-
sion. There is no reason to believe that the manner in which the evidence was obtained 
might mean that it was unreliable (in contrast, for example, to a “confession” obtained 
by bullying or threats), and so an application of the reliability principle would not lead 
to its exclusion. An application of the disciplinary principle might lead to the opposite 
conclusion: the police offi cers had acted improperly by disregarding the provisions of 
RIPSA and the relevant code of practice, and so the court should mark its disapproval 
by excluding the evidence obtained thereby.
But a disciplinary approach is open to obvious objections, not least that the court’s 
exclusion of the evidence may have little or no effect on the persons who acted improp-
erly, at the same time as conferring a substantial benefi t on a person who may have 
committed a serious crime – a benefi t which itself serves no disciplinary purpose and 
which runs contrary to the public interest in the detection and prosecution of crime. 
And if Parliament chose not to legislate in RIPSA to the effect that evidence obtained 
18 Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 45; Gilchrist v HM Advocate 2005 JC 34. Furthermore, it 
is now settled that s 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 does not act to prevent the Lord Advocate (or a 
procurator fi scal) from leading evidence obtained in breach of article 8: McGibbon v HM Advocate 2004 
JC 60.
19 Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 45; Allan v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 12.
20 (1993) 97 Cr App R 365.
21 (1993) 97 Cr App R 365 at 374 per Simon Brown LJ.
22 See Higgins at para 27.
23 A J Ashworth, “Excluding evidence as protecting rights” [1977] Crim LR 723.
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in breach of its provisions should be inadmissible in court, why should the courts 
independently append an exclusionary rule to the legislation?
A better approach, as advocated by Ashworth, may be to ask whether exclusion 
of the evidence in question is necessary in order to protect the rights of the accused. 
Here we have to ask what, exactly, is wrong with eavesdropping? Dealing with the 
question without reference to formal questions of Convention rights, if it is wrong 
because the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police cell which 
is violated by the practice,24 then it is diffi cult to see why anything should turn on 
whether the eavesdropping is accidental or deliberate: in either case, the suspect’s 
reasonable expectations have been breached. Yet the decision in Higgins implies that 
the distinction is crucial.25 Of course, it was accepted that the police offi cers’ actions in 
Higgins had breached article 8 of the Convention, but as already noted, the European 
Court has not been prepared to hold that such breaches should result in the exclusion 
of evidence obtained thereby.26
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,27 the Canadian Supreme 
Court,28 the High Court of Australia,29 the English Court of Appeal,30 and the United 
States Supreme Court31 have all suggested that, while eavesdropping may not be 
fatal to the admissibility of evidence, a line is crossed where the deceptive conduct 
of the police is such as to offend against the right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination. In other words, evidence obtained by eavesdropping is not per se 
inadmissible, but where the police employ an undercover offi cer (or private individual) 
to question a suspect without the benefi t of the usual protections such as a caution, the 
use of such evidence is prohibited. In terms of the ECHR, this result obtains because 
the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination are aspects of the right 
to a fair trial, and so the use of evidence obtained in this way violates that right.
This approach, which can be described as an application of the protective principle, 
is attractive because it makes clear why such evidence is to be excluded, rather 
than relying upon vague notions of “fairness”. The weight of comparative authority 
supporting it is not conclusive: it is open to the Scottish courts to adopt a stricter exclu-
sionary rule than that operating elsewhere. But if this is to be done, a more principled 
basis than assertions of “fairness” is called for. In any event, the approach is not alien to 
24 Although it might not be thought that such expectations could be particularly strong, the relevant Code 
of Practice states that police cells are included within “residential premises” for the purposes of RIPSA: 
see Higgins at para 23. This interpretation of the statute is doubted by Sir Gerald Gordon in his commen-
tary on the case (at 2006 SCCR 318). Cf A Ashworth, “Should the police be allowed to use deceptive 
practices?” (1998) 114 LQR 108 at 137.
25 In addition to Higgins itself, some of the earliest relevant Scottish cases suggest that this distinction is of 
importance: Tait and Stevenson (1824) Alison, ii, 536 (but see John Johnston (1845) 2 Broun 401, where 
the accuracy of Alison’s note of that case is doubted) and Miller (1837) Bell’s Notes 244.
26 Nor have the Scottish courts been prepared to accept at common law that exclusion of evidence is a 
necessary consequence of irregular activity by investigatory authorities: see Lawrie v Muir 1950 JC 19 
at 26-27 per Lord Justice-General Cooper.
27 Allan v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 12.
28 R v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151; R v Broyles [1991] 3 SCR 595; R v Liew [1999] 3 SCR 227.
29 R v Swaffi eld and Pavic [1998] HCA 1. 
30 R v Roberts [1997] 1 Cr App R 217, but see R v Jelen and Katz (1990) 90 Cr App R 456.
31 Kuhlmann v Wilson (1986) 477 US 436.
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Scots law, and is supported by the cases dealing with questioning by an individual who 
is effectively operating as an undercover agent of the police, in circumstances where 
the police could not interview the suspect without due caution. The courts have held 
that such questioning is improper as undermining well-established safeguards, and 
will result in any replies elicited being inadmissible in evidence.32
D. CONCLUSION
Fairness is an attractively fl exible but dangerously unprincipled concept. First instance 
decisions are not, of course, the most appropriate circumstances for fundamental 
questions of principle to be addressed. It is suggested, however, that issues such as 
those arising in Higgins would be better understood and addressed if the principles 
underlying the exclusion of irregularly obtained evidence were better articulated and 
understood.33
In such circumstances, relying solely on the common law principle of fairness, 
rather than the more principled approach under the ECHR, may be undesirable. 
There is no question of incompatibility here: the Scottish courts are free to apply 
exclusionary rules which go further than the Convention requires. But in formulating 
such rules, reference to the Convention may be a useful source of principle rather 
than an unnecessary resort.
James Chalmers
University of Edinburgh
32 HM Advocate v Graham 1991 SLT 416; HM Advocate v Campbell 1964 JC 80. Cf Weir v Jessop 1991 JC 
146, where Lord Justice-Clerk Ross doubted (at 152) whether the evidence obtained in Campbell should 
have been held inadmissible, on the basis that the suspect in that case had offered to make a voluntary 
statement to a reporter (who was, in the event, accompanied by an undercover police offi cer) and had 
not done so as the result of questioning. This fortifi es rather than weakens the argument presented 
here.
33 See also P Duff, “Admissibility of improperly obtained physical evidence in the Scottish criminal trial: 
the search for principle” (2004) 8 Edin LR 152.
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